On November 1, 2025, the Commission issued a policy brief[1] in which it rejected calls to extend the legal professional privilege to in-house counsel communication. The Commission examined the question after stakeholders called for such an extension as part of the revision process of the regulation governing antitrust investigation, Regulation 1/2003.[2]

As part of our response to the European Commission’s consultation on possible reforms to its merger control guidelines,[1] we submitted our observations on Topic Paper G – Public Policy, Security, and Labour Market Considerations.

On November 3, 2025, the French Competition Authority (the “FCA”) imposed a EUR 7.6 million fine on the Parfait group for failing to comply with commitments entered into in the context of its acquisition of a hypermarket and shopping center in Martinique (the “Decision”),[1] illustrating the FCA’s continued vigilance regarding effective implementation of merger remedies. The Parfait group has appealed the Decision.

On October 15, 2025, the French Cour de cassation (“Court”) confirmed a €680,000 fine on the trade union Les Chirurgiens-Dentistes de France (“CDF”) (“Decision”).[1]  The Court held that the CDF’s call for a boycott of certain dental care networks constituted a restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU and Article L. 420-1 of the French Commercial Code.[2]


The French Cour de cassation confirms the FCA’s independence in settlement-referral procedures and classifies information exchanges between tenderers, including when exploring subcontracting, as a restriction by object.[1]

On September 24, 2025, the French Cour de cassation upheld the sanction imposed by the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) on Vinci group entities active in construction and technical services, and on their subsidiary Santerne Nord Tertiaire (“Santerne”), for unlawful exchanges of confidential information during a public tender procedure.

Introduction

In May 2025, the Commission launched a public consultation on possible reforms to its merger guidelines, covering seven core topics that underpin how the Commission assesses the competitive impact of mergers.[1] On October 29, the Commission summarized the main trends of the 243 responses[2] it received.[3] The highlights are as follows: