Energy, Chemicals & Infrastructure

On April 16, 2026, following requests for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof Amsterdam (Court of Appeal, Amsterdam), the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Joined Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23 concerning the interpretation of Article 8(1) of Regulation No. 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis Regulation) and its application in follow-on competition damages actions.[1] The ruling broadens claimants’ scope to choose the forum for follow-on damages claims by confirming that actions may be brought against parent and subsidiary entities that were not addressees of the underlying competition authority decision. This ruling further develops the Court of Justice’s recent case law at the intersection of private international law and competition law, following its February 2025 judgment in Athenian Brewery.[2]

The following is part of our annual publication Selected Issues for Boards of Directors in 2026. Explore all topics or download the PDF.


Antitrust in 2025 was marked by policy developments and enforcement that, while remaining aggressive, became less overtly anti-business. The U.S. continued several Biden-era cases but became more open to settlements, while maintaining the new and more burdensome HSR merger notification form and the more aggressive and less economically focused 2023 Merger Guidelines. It also faced leadership uncertainty, particularly at the DOJ. The European Commission conducted DMA enforcement actions and launched a broad consultation on the Merger Guidelines. The UK CMA shifted toward a more restrained approach, taking greater account of growth and signaling flexibility in merger remedies. China’s SAMR began intervening in transactions below filing thresholds and continued using antitrust as a tool amid geo-political tensions.

On January 13, 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the French Cour de cassation (“French Supreme Court”) confirmed its established case law according to which the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) may seize attorney-client documents covered by legal professional privilege (“LPP”) where these were not “prepared for the exercise of a party’s rights of the defense”, i.e., to defend a client who committed, or believes it committed, an offense liable to result in ongoing or anticipated judicial or regulatory proceedings and sanctions.[1]

On January 9, 2026, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) published the results of its third study on the French leniency procedure.[1]  The Study publishes feedback from more than 60 competition law practitioners on (i) the impact of procedural changes introduced in 2023, (ii) the key factors that encourage or discourage undertakings from applying for leniency, and (iii) the impact of potential follow-on damage actions on leniency applications.  The FCA will determine on the basis of the responses whether and how to adapt its leniency program.

Background

On December 18, 2025, the Court of Justice delivered its preliminary ruling in a case concerning an appeal by Lukoil against a Bulgarian competition authority decision which had imposed a fine on Lukoil for its refusal to grant access to third parties to essential infrastructure (fuel storage facilities, port terminals, and pipeline networks), originally constructed with public funds and subsequently privatized by Lukoil.[1]

On November 1, 2025, the Commission issued a policy brief[1] in which it rejected calls to extend the legal professional privilege to in-house counsel communication. The Commission examined the question after stakeholders called for such an extension as part of the revision process of the regulation governing antitrust investigation, Regulation 1/2003.[2]

On 16 October 2025, the CMA launched a public consultation on its draft revised Merger Remedies Guidance (the Draft Guidance).[1]  The revision reflects the Government’s call for a more business-friendly, pro-growth approach to merger control.[2]

Introduction

In May 2025, the Commission launched a public consultation on possible reforms to its merger guidelines, covering seven core topics that underpin how the Commission assesses the competitive impact of mergers.[1] On October 29, the Commission summarized the main trends of the 243 responses[2] it received.[3] The highlights are as follows:

On July 10, 2025, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) published both its 2024 Annual Report,[1] and its 2025-2026 Roadmap,[2] which outlines its priorities for the year ahead.