Antitrust enforcement in labor markets has become a focus of the U.S. antitrust regulators in recent years, with particular scrutiny on agreements between employers not to recruit or solicit each other’s employees—so-called “no poach” agreements.  In a recent decision, a court in China held no‑poach and employee compensation-fixing agreements to be illegal, the first such court decision in the country.  The court’s decision, however, reveals the difficulties in analyzing no-poach agreements within China’s existing antitrust regime and analytical framework.  This article provides an overview of the Chinese court’s reasoning in its recent decision and a comparative assessment to the approach in the United States.

On April 12, 2022, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) fined Compagnie Financière Européenne de Prises de Participation (“COFEPP”) 7 million euros for two distinct but related infringements, namely failing to notify a merger transaction (failure to notify) and implementing said transaction before merger control approval had been obtained (so-called “gun-jumping”).

On April 11, 2022,[1] the TAR Lazio annulled an ICA decision finding that Telecom Italia S.p.A. (“Tim”) had infringed Article 102 TFEU for allegedly abusing its dominant position in the market for Short Message Service (“SMS”) termination (the “Decision”).[2] The Court followed the same reasoning as that set out in its September 2021 judgment, in which it overturned the €5.7 million fine imposed by the ICA on Vodafone Italia S.p.A. (“Vodafone”) in a parallel decision.