On December 2, 2025, the European Court of Justice issued its ruling in Stichting v Apple,[1]clarifying that any competent national court in the Member State whose app store was used for the purchase of products can hear collective actions[2] on behalf of users of digital platforms for damages caused by anticompetitive conduct, without the need to individualize alleged victims or determine the exact location of their alleged harm.
Background
App developers wishing to sell apps on the Apple App Store must enter into an agreement with Apple, which sets the applicable commission tiers (typically, 15–30% of sale prices).[3] When purchasing apps, Apple users are automatically directed to the local version of the App Store linked to their Apple ID (which is required to access the App Store). While theoretically possible to change to another local App Store, doing so requires the user to change the country setting, accept new local terms and provide a valid local payment method.[4]
Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims, two Netherlands foundations representing consumers,[5] brought collective actions before the Amsterdam District Court (Rechtbank Amsterdam) claiming that Apple abused a dominant position on the market for the distribution of apps for Apple devices and on the App Store payment system by charging an excessive commission of 30% of the price paid for app purchases in the App Store, in breach of Article 102 TFEU.[6] They sought compensation for the harm alleged to have been suffered by iOS app purchasers.[7]
The Amsterdam District Court’s Doubt Regarding its Territorial Jurisdiction
The case concerned the application of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I bis”), which allows plaintiffs seeking compensation for damage caused by breaches of competition law to sue either (i) where the harmful act occurred or (ii) where the damage was suffered.[8] Article 7(2) is a derogation from the general principle that jurisdiction lies with the courts of the defendant’s place of domicile.[9] The interpretation of Article 7(2) was therefore central to Apple’s position, who disputed the Dutch courts’ jurisdiction on the basis that the alleged harmful event did not occur in the Netherlands, and, in particular, in Amsterdam, or, at most, that jurisdiction could extend only to claims relating to users who made purchases in Amsterdam via the Dutch App Store.[10]
In line with the flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines criteria, under which the place where the harmful event occurred is the market affected by the anticompetitive conduct and where the plaintiff claims to have suffered losses,[11] the Amsterdam District Court found that it had international jurisdiction over the alleged infringement of Article 102 TFEU in both respects:[12] (i) the harmful acts occurred in a market specifically targeting the Netherlands, as the Dutch App Store targets Dutch users, uses the Dutch language, and includes apps developed solely for that market;[13] and (ii) the damage consisted of allegedly excessively high prices paid in the Apple App Store by users residing in the Netherlands using Dutch bank accounts.[14]
While it was able to establish international jurisdiction,[15] the Amsterdam District Court expressed uncertainty regarding its territorial jurisdiction within the Netherlands; [16] namely where the place of the event giving rise to the damage or the place where the alleged damage occurred is located within the Netherlands.[17] According to Volvo and Others, the court having jurisdiction is that of the place of purchase of goods or, in the case of purchases made in several places, the place where the injured party’s registered office is located.[18] However, for online app purchases available for download worldwide, the place of purchase is less clear. Applying Volvo, arguably each local court would only have jurisdiction in relation to purchasers who reside or are established within that court’s territorial jurisdiction. This would undermine the procedural economy of collective actions by preventing a unified collective action being brought before a single local court of a Member State.[19] Accordingly, the Amsterdam District Court referred preliminary questions to the Court of Justice in this regard.[20]
Territorial Jurisdiction in Digital Markets Based on “Virtual Spaces”
The Court of Justice found that the criteria established in Volvo and Others for the purchase of material goods, namely that territorial jurisdiction may be determined by the place of purchase or, where purchases occurred in multiple locations, by the injured party’s registered office, do not apply mutatis mutandis to a collective action relating to the purchase of digital products, on an online platform, by an indefinite number of persons who were unidentified but identifiable at the time the action was brought. Instead, the connecting factors in Volvo and Others must be adapted to preserve the effectiveness of Article 7(2) Brussels I bis and to promote the sound administration of justice.[21] In the present case, because the Dutch App Store is tailored to the Netherlands, the Court of Justice considered that the “virtual space” constituted by the Dutch App Store corresponds to the entire territory of the Netherlands. Consequently, damages from purchases made in such a virtual space can be considered to occur across the entirety of the Netherlands, regardless of where the users were located at the time of the purchase, and without the need to fragment collective claims across individual territorial jurisdictions of the local courts of a Member State.[22] Accordingly, the Court of Justice found that the inability to determine the precise location of damage for each individual alleged victim does not prevent the application of Article 7(2) Brussels I bis, as it is possible to identify a well-defined geographical area to which the market affected by the conduct belongs.[23]
Key Takeaways
The judgment is demonstrative of the EU trend to facilitate collective redress for consumers in digital markets through private enforcement of competition law, by clarifying the application of rules relating to international and territorial jurisdiction to collective damage claims in digital markets. The Court of Justice’s recognition of a “virtual space” corresponding to an entire national territory, together with the absence of any requirement to individualize victims or determine the exact location of their harm,[24] facilitates collective actions against digital platforms by clarifying the territorial jurisdiction within Member States and avoiding the logistical and procedural hurdles of fragmentation of collective claims across the individual territorial jurisdictions of the courts of a Member State.
[1] Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims v Apple Distribution International Ltd and Apple Inc. (“Stichting v Apple”)(Case C-34/24) EU:C:2025:936.
[2] The Court of Justice ruling refers to “representative actions”. However, for clarity, this article uses the term “collective actions” which is also most similar to the Dutch law term (collectieve actie).
[3] Ibid., para. 15.
[4] Ibid., para. 17.
[5] Ibid., para. 18.
[6] The claimants also alleged that Apple, by engaging in vertical price-fixing, also infringed Article 101 TFEU (Stichting v Apple para. 20). However, this was of minor relevance in the case for different reasons. First, regarding the location of the event causing the alleged harm, the Amsterdam District Court held that it could not assert jurisdiction in the context of Article 101 TFEU because no specific event had been identified in the Netherlands where either the alleged restrictive agreement was concluded or the harm-causing arrangement occurred (Ibid., para. 24). Second, the Court of Justice noted that the distinction between Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU claims was irrelevant when determining the location of the alleged harm (Ibid., para. 28).
[7] Ibid., para. 19.
[8] Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ 2012, L 351, pp. 1–32.
[9] Stichting v Apple, para. 44.
[10] Ibid, para. 21.
[11] flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines (Case C‑27/17) EU:C:2018:533, para. 43.
[12] Stichting v Apple, paras. 25 and 31.
[13] Ibid, para. 25.
[14] Ibid, paras. 27–30.
[15] In civil or commercial disputes involving a cross-border element, ‘international jurisdiction’ concerns whether the courts of a given Member State have jurisdiction to hear that dispute.This is governed by Brussels I bis. International jurisdiction does not, however, determine which specific court within that Member State is competent.
[16] ‘Territorial jurisdiction’ determines which specific court within the competent Member State has jurisdiction. This matter is usually governed by domestic procedural law. However, there are instances where Brussels I bis establishes a connecting factor that localizes jurisdiction within the Member State. For instance, this is the case for Article 7(2) Brussels I bis, which confers directly not only international but also territorial jurisdiction.
[17] Stichting v Apple, para. 33.
[18] RH v AB Volvo and Others (“Volvo and Others”) (Case C-30/20) EU:C:2021:604.
[19] Stichting v Apple, paras. 33–34.
[20] The Amsterdam District Court referred several preliminary questions to the CJEU on Article 7(2) of Regulation 1215/2012, including: (i) the place where the harmful act occurred when an online platform is globally accessible; (ii) whether the user’s registered office is the sole connecting factor for the place of damage or if other factors apply; (iii) the relevance of claims brought by a legal person representing multiple users across different jurisdictions; (iv) whether national law can designate a single court when multiple domestic courts are competent; and (v) whether national law can refer all claims to a single court when multiple domestic courts are territorially competent over different users’ claims. The Court of Justice considered it necessary to answer questions relating to the connecting factors and the role of a legal person representing multiple users, with the remaining questions being redundant once jurisdiction was already established.
[21] Stichting v Apple, paras. 60–61.
[22] Ibid., para. 62.
[23] Ibid, para. 67.
[24] Ibid., para. 66.