Jurisdictions

On May 5, 2026, the European Commission (the Commission) published its 2025 Report on Competition Policy (the Report). The Report highlights initiatives undertaken during Commissioner Ribera’s first year in office and provides an indication of the direction of enforcement in the coming years. Six takeaways may be identified:

On April 30, 2026, the Court of Justice (the Court) delivered its preliminary ruling in CD Tondela and Others, one of its first judgments[1] addressing no-poach restrictions under Article 101 TFEU.[2] The Court held that although no-poach agreements must generally be classified as restrictions “by object”, a specific examination of their context and objectives against the relevant legal and economic background may prove otherwise. The ruling provides useful insight into the treatment of no-poach agreements under EU competition law, an area of increased scrutiny by the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs).

Principal Changes and Implications

The European Commission today published a draft of its long-awaited revision of the Merger Guidelines, combining the 2004 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 2008 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines into a single document that takes account of the Draghi Report’s call for more dynamic, forward-looking merger control, acknowledges the benefits of scale, resilience, innovation, and global competitiveness, and suggests a greater readiness to take positive account of efficiencies. The Draft Guidelines represent a significant evolution in the Commission’s approach to mergers, although their practical implications may take time to emerge. Announcing the Draft Guidelines, Commission President von der Leyen underlined the need “to better support companies to thrive, scale and innovate … so we can meet the realities of the fiercely competitive global economy and boost our competitiveness,” while Executive Vice President Ribera emphasized the “unchanged” purpose of “protecting strong, competitive markets without allowing an accumulation of power that can be abused.” A final text of the new Merger Guidelines is expected later this year, although the principles set out in the Draft Guidelines will likely shape the Commission’s assessment of ongoing cases.

On April 16, 2026, the French Competition Authority (the FCA) issued a decision imposing a €12.67 million fine on Synadis Bio, an organic food retail trade association, and three retailers (Greenweez, Les Comptoirs de la Bio, and ITM Entreprises) for a single, complex, and continuous agreement allocating organic food brands between organic food stores and generalist supermarkets in France (the Decision).[1] The Decision confirms that brand allocation arrangements are restrictions by object and marks the second use of the FCA’s expanded fining powers against trade associations.

DG COMP has a new Director-General – Anthony Whelan, a long-serving European Commission official who has been at the heart of EU regulation and competition law for over 30 years. Currently DG COMP’s Deputy Director-General for State aid, he has held a wide range of roles over his career: he has worked in the Commission Legal Service, headed the cabinet of former Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes, was a Director in DG CONNECT, and advised Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on digital policy.

On March 17, 2026, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) fined the National Union of French Ski Instructors (Syndicat national des moniteurs du ski français, “SNMSF”) €3.4 million for imposing an exclusivity obligation on its member instructors.[1] The FCA found that the SNMSF had implemented an exclusivity obligation prohibiting its ski instructors from teaching at competing ski schools or developing their own clientele outside the French Ski School (Ecole de Ski Française,“ESF”) network. The decision confirms the FCA’s continued scrutiny of labor markets and reaffirms that sports activities are subject to competition law. It also marks the first time the FCA has applied Article L. 464-2 of the French Commercial Code, allowing it to seek financial contributions from professional association members (in this case, the SNMSF’s members).