On May 8, 2025, the European Commission (the “EC”) launched a public consultation on the EU Merger Guidelines (together, the “Guidelines”), which describe the framework applied by the EC to assess the competitive impact of horizontal and non-horizontal mergers (the “Consultation”).[1] The Consultation responds to the Draghi Report’s call for “more forward-looking and agile” EU merger control that takes greater account of innovation and future competition in assessing mergers.[2]
On July 29, 2024, the Court of Justice issued its preliminary ruling in case C-298/22 Banco BPN v. BIC Português and others.[1] The Court confirmed that a “standalone” exchange of information between competitors – meaning that the information exchange in question constitutes the examined conduct in itself and is not ancillary to any other conduct – can be deemed a restriction of competition by object under Article 101 TFEU. This ruling is important because it clarifies that information exchange can constitute a restriction by object, even if it is not linked to a wider anti-competitive practice and no actual market impact has been shown.[2]
On November 9, 2023, the European Court of Justice dismissed, on most grounds, [1] Altice’s appeal against the General Court’s judgment[2] upholding the European Commission’s decision, in 2018,[3] to fine Altice €124.5 million for gun-jumping violations in connection with its acquisition of PT Portugal. The Court of Justice confirmed that Altice breached the EU Merger Regulation’s notification and standstill obligations by acquiring and exercising decisive influence over PT Portugal prior to obtaining Commission approval. The Commission had fined Altice €62.25 million for each of the two infringements. The Court of Justice reduced one of the fines by about €10 million on account of the Commission’s failure to properly state reasons, but the judgment supports the trend toward strict enforcement of EU rules against early implementation of M&A transactions.[4]
Non-binding opinion finds that General Court erred in applying heightened standard of proof to cases involving unilateral effects in oligopolistic markets.