On June 11, 2025, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) issued its first-ever decision[1] sanctioning no-poach agreements as stand-alone infringements.[2] Fines totaling EUR 29.5 million were imposed on three companies operating in the engineering, technology consulting, and IT services sectors.
Background
In April 2018, Ausy (now Randstad Digital) filed a leniency application disclosing to the FCA the existence of several agreements designed to reduce staff turnover between competitors in the engineering, technology consulting, and IT services sectors.
Following this application, the FCA opened an ex officio investigation in July 2018 and carried out dawn raids in the premises of several companies active in the engineering, technology consulting, and IT services sectors in November 2018. In June 2023, the FCA divided the investigation into two separate cases, retaining in the case leading to this Decision only the practices related to alleged non-solicitation agreements.
The FCA gave the case significant publicity, notably by announcing and presenting its Decision during a press conference.[3]
The case also reflects a broader European trend of enforcement against no-poach agreements, confirming that labor markets are now a clear enforcement priority for EU and national competition authorities.
The No-Poach “Gentlemen’s Agreements” Sanctioned
On the basis of the information provided by the leniency applicant and the documents gathered during the dawn raids, the FCA found that four companies had entered into two informal anticompetitive “gentlemen’s agreements”[4] under which they mutually agreed to refrain from both poaching (direct solicitation) and hiring (following spontaneous application) each other’s employees:
- A first agreement allegedly prohibiting the poaching and hiring of business managers between Ausy and Alten. The FCA considered that Ausy’s submissions along with certain seized emails between Ausy and Alten were sufficient to prove the existence of this agreement between 2007 and 2016. The FCA notably dismissed the claims that the agreement was simply a one-sided commitment by former Alten managers who joined Ausy, meant only to avoid unfair competition by not recruiting Alten’s business managers.
- A second agreement between Bertrandt and Expleo allegedly prohibiting poaching and hiring each other’s employees in the automotive sector, extending even to unsolicited job applications. The FCA’s findings mainly relied on evidence collected during the dawn raids, such as internal and inter-company emails implementing the agreement.
After a cursory analysis, the FCA considered that the alleged agreements amounted to restrictions of competition “by object” under Article 101(1)(c) TFEU and Article L. 420-1(4°) of the French Commercial Code, which prohibit the allocation of markets or sources of supply.
The Decision asserted that, by agreeing not to compete for employees, the parties abstained from competing on human resources, described as one of the most strategic parameters of their business activity. The FCA did not examine the specificities of the roles actually covered by the agreement, but instead generalized its reasoning to human resources as a whole.
The FCA also considered that alternative means – both legal and in terms of human resources policy – were available to protect against unfair large-scale employee poaching, and dismissed claims that the practices were a way to combat unfair competition. The FCA argued that the pursuit of a legitimate objective does not prevent practices from being characterized as having an anti-competitive object.
By classifying the agreements as restrictions “by object,” the FCA effectively avoided any assessment of the actual or even potential anti-competitive effects of the practices.
Dismissal Of The Accusations Concerning Non-Solicitation Clauses In Partnership Contracts
The FCA took a more nuanced approach towards non-solicitation clauses embedded in partnership agreements – such as consortia or subcontracting arrangements – between Bertrandt and Expleo and between Atos and Ausy.
After reviewing their content, purpose, and economic and legal context, the FCA found that these non-solicitation clauses did not constitute restrictions of competition by object because they were limited in scope, applied only to certain employees, related to specific projects, and of limited duration. It considered that these clauses sought to ensure the stability of a small number of employees assigned to a specific project within the framework of a partnership between companies, thereby guaranteeing proper project execution.
The FCA also found there was insufficient evidence to establish that these clauses had anti-competitive effects.
However, it stressed that the Decision does not create a “safe harbor” for non-solicitation clauses and noted that the legality of non-solicitation clauses must be assessed on a case by case basis, depending on proportionality to the legitimate objectives pursued. Broader or disproportionate clauses could therefore still be deemed anti-competitive by object.[5]
Fine Calculation Methodology
The FCA applied its 2021 Fining Guidelines,[6] dismissing the Parties’ claims that applying them to practices that took place before 2021 breached the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. Similarly, the Decision asserted that the fact that these practices were implemented in isolation, rather than as part of a broader cartel, neither made them novel nor justified disregarding the Guidelines or reducing fines.
With respect to the value of sales, the fine for the Ausy-Alten agreement – limited to business managers – was calculated on the basis of personnel expenses for that specific role. By contrast, the Bertrandt-Expleo agreement allegedly encompassed all employees in the automotive sector, leading the FCA to take into account the companies’ total personnel expenses in that sector.
Alleging that horizontal agreements allocating sources of supply are particularly serious, the FCA applied a 16% rate to the sales value, before applying a duration coefficient to each of the concerned agreements.
On this basis, the FCA imposed fines of EUR 24 million on Alten, EUR 3.6 million on Bertrandt, and EUR 1.9 million on Expleo. Ausy, the leniency applicant, received full immunity. Additionally, the sanctioned companies were ordered to publish a summary of the Decision on LinkedIn and in the newspaper Le Monde Informatique.
Key Takeaways
The Decision reflects the FCA’s view that no-poach agreements constitute serious violations under Article 101(1)(c) of the TFEU and Article L. 420-1(4°) of the French Commercial Code, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union.[7] While the FCA had previously addressed no-poach practices as part of broader anti-competitive agreements,[8] this Decision is the first in which it found such agreements, alone, could constitute restrictions by object subject to stand-alone enforcement.
The FCA’s approach goes further than any previous European enforcement, imposing the highest fine ever for an alleged stand-alone no-poach infringement. By contrast, the European Commission imposed a EUR 329 million fine against Delivery Hero and Glovo on June 2, 2025[9] for a broader set of practices, including market sharing, exchange of commercially sensitive information and no-poach.
The FCA emphasized its continued vigilance regarding human resources agreements, particularly in the digital sector, where skilled talent is both scarce and vital for competition.
[1] FCA Decision No. 25-D-03 of June 11, 2025 regarding no-poach practices in the engineering, technology consulting and IT services sectors, available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/integral_texts/2025-07/25d03_version_publique_0.pdf (the “Decision”).
[2] In earlier cases, such as Decision No. 17-D-20 or Decision No. 24-D-06, the FCA referred to no-poach provisions only as elements within broader restrictive agreements.
[3] FCA presentation of June 11, 2025, No-poach practices: the Autorité de la concurrence fines four companies in the engineering, technology consulting and IT services sectors, (presentation material), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2025-06/SSII%20diapoEN2.pdf
[4] Gentlemen’s agreements are general agreements, often informal and open-ended in duration and with a very large scope, either because they concern a sector, all the customers of the companies concerned or all the employees, etc. Source: FCA presentation of June 11, 2025, No-poach practices: the Autorité de la concurrence fines four companies in the engineering, technology consulting and IT services sectors, (presentation material), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2025-06/SSII%20diapoEN2.pdf
[5] FCA Press release, “No-poach practices: the Autorité de la concurrence fines four companies in the engineering, technology consulting and IT services sectors”, June 11, 2025, available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/press-release/no-poach-practices-autorite-de-la-concurrence-fines-four-companies-engineering.
[6] FCA Procedural notice on the method for determining fines of July 30, 2021 available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/Communique_sanction.pdf
[7] Toshiba Corporation e.a./Commission (Case C-373/14), January 20, 2016, para. 28; and FIFA (Case C-650/22), October 4, 2024, para. 129.
[8] See FCA Decision No. 24-D-06 of May 21, 2024 regarding practices implemented in the pre-cast concrete products sector, available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/fr/decision/relative-des-pratiques-mises-en-oeuvre-dans-le-secteur-des-produits-prefabriques-en-beton.
[9] See Commission Decision No. C(2025) 3304 final of June 2, 2025 in Case AT.40795 – Food Delivery Service, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202530/AT_40795_1262.pdf.