The French Competition Authority publishes its third study on the leniency procedure

By Chloé Delay & Anita Magraner Oliver on January 9, 2026

On January 9, 2026, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) published the results of its third study on the French leniency procedure.[1] The Study publishes feedback from more than 60 competition law practitioners on (i) the impact of procedural changes introduced in 2023, (ii) the key factors that encourage or discourage undertakings from applying for leniency, and (iii) the impact of potential follow-on damage actions on leniency applications. The FCA will determine on the basis of the responses whether and how to adapt its leniency program.

Background

The FCA last reformed its leniency procedure in December 2023.[2] The reform implemented the “DDADUE” law, which transposed the ECN+ directive[3] harmonizing the leniency procedure at EU level.[4]

The Study notes several general trends:

First, the number of leniency applications has increased steadily in recent years, at an average of 45% per year since 2020.[5]
Second, the scope of sectors covered in leniency applications has expanded. While they initially mostly concerned traditional sectors such as equipment, construction, consumer goods, and agri-food, leniency applications now extend to all types of sectors.[6]
Third, reported practices are increasingly complex. Applications covering cartels for pure price-fixing or market-sharing agreements are now relatively rare.[7]
Finally, leniency applicant profiles have considerably evolved in recent years. French applicants were still relatively uncommon as recently as five years ago. Today, they represent 30% of applications, ahead of US (20%), German or Dutch (11.5% each), and Swiss firms (7%).[8]

Observations on the operation of the new leniency procedure

The Study sought observations on two changes introduced by the 2023 Revised Leniency Guidelines:

The Rapporteur Général, rather than the FCA’s Collège, was granted the ability to examine leniency applications and define ranges for fine reductions. 72% of practitioners considered the change has contributed to improving the leniency’s procedural efficiency. Respondents valued the Rapporteur Général’s new responsibility to authorize continued participation in the practices pending the Collège’s formal approval of the leniency application. Under the previous procedure, parties faced significant uncertainty pending the Collège’s approval of the leniency application as they continued to engage in prohibited practices in the meantime.[9]
The possibility of submitting a leniency application through a secure electronic form was introduced, complementing the existing options (i.e., applying by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt or orally, by telephone or in person at the FCA). A majority of respondents (53%) welcomed the possibility of submitting leniency applications via a secure electronic form, although 70% of practitioners have favored in-person meetings at the FCA’s premises when reporting cartel practices.[10]

Factors deterring/prompting leniency applications

The Study identified the following main factors as deterring leniency applications:

The “psychological barrier” of acknowledging an involvement in unlawful practices that can damage a firm’s reputation and entail civil liability. Respondents suggested that leniency applicants should benefit from additional anonymity measures to avoid reputational risks and potential retaliation, for example by not publishing a decision in cases where a leniency application was made to avoid revealing the identity of the leniency applicant.[11]
The fear of criminal prosecution, as criminal immunity applies only to executives of leniency applicants that are granted full immunity.[12] Employees are otherwise subject to criminal sanctions.[13]

The Study identified the following incentives to promote leniency applications:

Fine reductions are the most effective incentive to leniency applications.[14]
These are followed closely by the initiation of investigations[15] and dawn raids,[16] as well as by the perceived detection risk,[17] and the filing of leniency applications with another competition authority.[18]
Less significant factors include compliance programs within the company,[19] and due diligence conducted before or after a merger,[20] which can help detect violations.
Mistrust among cartel members and the cartel’s lack of profitability[21] are only moderately likely to prompt a leniency application. The perspective of a change in the company’s market position[22] and the potential improvement in the company’s image following the submission of a leniency application[23] are also less significant factors.

The impact of potential follow-on damage claims

Finally, the FCA inquired about the impact of the risk of follow-on damage actions on incentives to apply for leniency after the transposition into French law of provisions of the ECN+ and Damages directives.[24] The French Commercial Code now exempts from civil liability leniency applicants that have received full immunity from a fine if (i) a victim of the practice did not contract “directly or indirectly” with the applicant, and (ii) the victim of the anticompetitive practice was able to obtain damages from other parties to the infringement.[25] It also prohibits judges from ordering the production of self-incriminating statements submitted in a leniency application.[26], [27] Nevertheless, despite this limited immunity from civil liability, the Study reports that 93% of respondents indicated that the risk of follow-on actions still deters firms from submitting leniency applications.[28]

The Study also tested the possibility of introducing broader civil immunity provisions, as envisaged by the Monopolkommission in Germany, whereby firms granted full immunity would be shielded from damages actions if victims can obtain damages from other parties to the practices.[29] A majority of respondents (67%) favored this proposal, while a minority raised the concerns that (i) it could undermine victims’ compensation rights as firms that are granted full immunity are, in practice, most likely to settle; (ii) firms could exploit this tool to eliminate competitors, as they would have to pay damages without being able to bring a claim against the first leniency applicant; and (iii) the measure could discourage other leniency applicants.[30]

Conclusion

The recent increase in leniency applications since 2020 suggests that the changes to the leniency procedure introduced in 2023 – such as faster processing of leniency applications and liability limitations in damages actions – have certainly contributed to the upward trend. However, the Study suggests that there remain areas of possible improvement, such as further liability limitations. The FCA will now determine whether to further adapt its leniency practices based on these market responses.

[1] French Competition Authority, 3^ème étude relative au programme de clémence (“Study”). Previous studies in 2014 and 2018 have assessed the French leniency procedure.

[2] French Competition Authority, Communiqué de procédure du 15 décembre 2023 relatif au programme de clémence français (the “Revised Leniency Guidelines”). For more information, see French Competition Law Newsletter article “The French Competition Authority publishes its revised leniency guidelines” of December 15, 2023, available here.

[3] Law No. 2020-1508 of December 3, 2020 concerning various provisions of adaptation to European Union law in economic and financial matters (“DDADUE law”).

[4] Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 11, 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (“ECN+ directive”), transposed into French law by Decree No. 2021-568 of May 10, 2021 and Order No. 2021-649 of May 26, 2021.

[5] The Study, p. 6.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] The Study, p. 4.

[9] The Study, pp. 8-9.

[10] The Study, pp. 10-11.

[11] The Study, p. 27.

[12] The Study, p. 28. See also Article L. 420-6-1 of the French Commercial Code.

[13] Article L. 420-6 of the French Commercial Code.

[14] The Study, p. 12.

[15] The Study, p. 13.

[16] The Study, p. 17.

[17] The Study, p. 13.

[18] The Study, p. 14.

[19] The Study, p. 15.

[20] The Study, p. 16.

[21] The Study, p. 17.

[22] The Study, p. 18.

[23] The Study, p. 17.

[24] Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 26, 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (“Damages directive”), transposed into French law by Order No. 2017-303 of March 9, 2017.

[25] Article L. 481-11 of the French Commercial Code.

[26] Article L. 483-5 of the French Commercial Code.

[27] For more information, see French Competition Law Newsletter article “The French Competition Authority publishes its revised leniency guidelines” of December 15, 2023, available here.

[28] The Study, p. 19.

[29] The Study, p. 25.

[30] The Study, pp. 26-27.