Since the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, the French Government has notified a series of measures to the European Commission on the basis of the Temporary Framework adopted by the European Commission in order to enable Member States to support their economy in this specific context.[1] Such measures were authorized by the Commission under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, as listed below.[2] The Commission also authorized a tax deferral scheme directed at French airlines under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU “to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances”.

On April 3, 2020, the Italian Supreme Court upheld the Milan Court of Appeal’s judgment that had dismissed the follow-on damages claim brought by Uno Communications S.p.A. (“Uno”) against Telecom Italia S.p.A. and TIM Italia S.p.A. (“Telecom”), concerning the conduct investigated and fined by the ICA in Case A537.[1]

On April 2, 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) ruled on a 2018 preliminary reference from Hungary’s Supreme Court, vacating on appeal the decision of the Hungarian competition authority. The authority found that an agreement on multilateral interchange fees (“MIFs”) constituted a by-object and by-effect infringement of Article 101 TFEU.[1] The judgment concerns two heavily discussed topics: the notion of restriction of competition by object vs effect,[2] and MIFs.[3]

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic disruption, including supply shortages, cost increases, and liquidity constraints resulting from a prolonged shutdown. As EU Member States and businesses respond to these challenges, their actions continue to raise potential issues under EU competition law.

CMA merger decisions are subject to judicial review by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). Challenges to the CMA’s substantive decision-making have, however, generally been unsuccessful. Although the CAT has been willing to intervene on matters of procedural fairness and errors of law, as recent decisions confirm, the CAT is reluctant to intervene in the CMA’s assessment of competitive effects and identification of remedies.