In the latest episode of Antitrust Review, host Nick Levy is joined by Gina Cass-Gottlieb, Chair of the ACCC, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
Antitrust Review Episode 19: In Conversation With Bruce Hoffman & Dave Gelfand
In the latest instalment of the Cleary Gottlieb Antitrust Review podcast, host Nick Levy is joined by Bruce Hoffman, Director
FCO Declares OpenAI/Microsoft Cooperation (Currently) Not Subject To Merger Control
On November 15, 2023, the German Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) concluded that Microsoft’s investments in and cooperation with OpenAI, Inc. (“OpenAI”) do not constitute a notifiable merger under German law. [1]
European Court of Justice Confirms Altice’s Gun-Jumping Violation
On November 9, 2023, the European Court of Justice dismissed, on most grounds, [1] Altice’s appeal against the General Court’s judgment[2] upholding the European Commission’s decision, in 2018,[3] to fine Altice €124.5 million for gun-jumping violations in connection with its acquisition of PT Portugal. The Court of Justice confirmed that Altice breached the EU Merger Regulation’s notification and standstill obligations by acquiring and exercising decisive influence over PT Portugal prior to obtaining Commission approval. The Commission had fined Altice €62.25 million for each of the two infringements. The Court of Justice reduced one of the fines by about €10 million on account of the Commission’s failure to properly state reasons, but the judgment supports the trend toward strict enforcement of EU rules against early implementation of M&A transactions.[4]
Antitrust Review Episode 17: In Conversation With Dr. Jorge Padilla
In the latest instalment of Cleary’s Antitrust Review, host Nick Levy is joined by Dr. Jorge Padilla, one of Europe’s
The Merger Control Review, Ed. 14 – European Union
Cleary Gottlieb partner Nicholas Levy and associates Anita Magraner Oliver and Conor Opdebeeck-Wilson co-authored the “European Union” chapter in The
European Commission asserts merger control jurisdiction over non-reportable deals for first time after Illumina/Grail
On August 17, 2023, the European Commission (EC) decided to review Qualcomm’s acquisition of the Israeli-based semiconductor company Autotalks, even though the deal was not reportable at EU or Member State level. Just one day later, on August 18, 2023, the EC also accepted jurisdiction over another non-reportable deal – European Energy Exchange’s (EEX) acquisition of Nasdaq’s European power trading and clearing business (Nasdaq Power).
The French Competition Authority unconditionally approves the creation of an airport catering joint venture between Aéroports de Paris and British caterer Select Service Partner following an in-depth investigation
On August 8, 2023, following an in-depth investigation (“Phase 2”), the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) unconditionally approved the creation of a full-function joint venture between Aéroports de Paris (“ADP”) and the British caterer Select Service Partner (“SSP”, together “the Parties”) for the operation of catering services at Paris-Orly and Paris Roissy-Charles de Gaulle airports.[1]
The French Competition Authority conditionally approves the acquisition of Sirestco Group by Areas Group in the provision of highway catering services
On July 25, 2023, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) approved, subject to remedies, the acquisition by the Areas Group (“Areas”) of sole control of its French competitor, Sirestco Group (“Sirestco”, together, “the Parties”) in the sector for the provision of highway catering services.[1]
FTC & DOJ Propose Radical Changes to Merger Guidelines
The new draft guidelines depart from decades of practice by introducing novel presumptions that could make it harder for mergers to obtain regulatory clearance from the agencies.
On July 19, 2023, the FTC and DOJ published draft merger guidelines.[1] Historically, the purpose of these guidelines has been to provide the public, including companies whose transactions are potentially subject to agency review, with information about how the agencies analyze mergers to identify potential competitive harm. The guidelines have no force of law and are not binding on the courts, though courts have relied on them as persuasive authority to varying degrees. Past iterations of the guidelines have therefore provided a neutral explanation of the agencies’ approach, including descriptions of the economic tools that they and the courts can use to assess a merger’s likely competitive effects.