Abuse

On October 26, 2023, the European Court of Justice issued a preliminary ruling in EDP – Energias de Portugal and Others,[1] upon request from the Lisbon Court of Appeals, which had asked for clarification on how to assess non-compete clauses under Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU and whether these could constitute “by object” restrictions.  The Court of Justice clarified the standard of assessment of such non-compete clauses, confirming that they can be categorized as restrictions by object if they display a sufficient degree of harm to competition.

On October 25, 2023, the General Court delivered its judgment in Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v. Commission.[1]  In a shift in the case law that signals an increased focus on effects in Article 102 cases, the General Court concluded that the Commission failed to establish that the examined conduct constituted a refusal to supply, let alone an abuse of dominance by Bulgarian Energy Holding, Bulgartransgaz, and Bulgargaz (together, “the BEH Group”).  The judgment clarifies the evidentiary standard required to establish causality between purportedly abusive practices and their resulting potential anticompetitive effects.  It also concludes that the Commission infringed the BEH Group’s rights of defense during the administrative procedure.  The judgment signals the General Court’s willingness to scrutinize technical factual assessments that are often heavily contested by companies in competition law investigations.

On October 18, 2023, the General Court dismissed[1] the appeals of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd (“Teva”) and Cephalon Inc. (“Cephalon”) against the Commission’s decision imposing a €60.5 million fine on both pharmaceutical companies for pay-for-delay agreements.[2]  The General Court confirmed the Commission’s conclusion that Teva and Cephalon’s patent settlement agreement was aimed at preventing Teva from entering the market with its generic modafinil drug, and therefore restricted competition by object and by effect.

On September 22, 2023, the European Commission (“the Commission”) re-adopted parts of its 2009 Intel decision[1] and imposed a fine of €376 million on Intel for abusing its dominance in x86 central processing units (“CPUs”) through naked restrictions.[2]  The re-adopted decision follows the General Court’s 2022 renvoi judgment, which overturned the €1.06 billion fine that the Commission had originally imposed on Intel in 2009.[3]  It marks the latest—but certainly not the last—development in a saga spanning over 20 years.

On 9 August 2023, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) published a joint position paper on online choice architecture (OCA), titled “Harmful design in digital markets: How Online Choice Architecture practices can undermine consumer choice and control over personal information”.  The paper forms part of the agencies’ work under the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum, which brings together multiple UK regulatory bodies to advance their combined thinking on regulatory issues in the digital economy.

On July 27, 2023, the General Rapporteur of the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) confirmed the notification to Apple of a statement of objections (“SO”) concerning potential anticompetitive practices in the sector for the distribution of mobile applications, likely to have consequences on several related markets for advertising and consumer services.[1]

On June 29, 2023, the Court of Justice ruled on questions referred by the Lisbon Court of Appeals relating to alleged resale price maintenance (“RPM”) by Super Bock, a Portuguese beverage manufacturer.[1]  The Court of Justice held, inter alia, that a vertical agreement fixing minimum prices is not necessarily a restriction of competition by object despite its characterization as a “hardcore restriction” under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (“VBER”)[2] and, in certain circumstances, the existence of an agreement may be inferred from “explicit or tacit acquiescence” by the distributors to an invitation to comply with minimum resale prices.[3]

On July 4, 2023, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Meta Platforms Inc. v. Bundeskartellamt,[1] following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court (“Düsseldorf Court”) on the validity of the German Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) 2019 decision finding that Meta Platforms (“Meta”)[2] abused its dominant position by collecting and processing data without users giving their consent freely.[3]  The Court of Justice confirmed that competition authorities can find breach of data protection rules under the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) where that finding is necessary to establish the existence of an abuse of dominance under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).  The Court of Justice however emphasized that competition authorities are required to consult and cooperate with national supervisory authorities in charge of GDPR enforcement (“GDPR authorities”).

The CMA has published its Annual Report on the UK’s concurrency arrangements, which came into effect in their current form in 2014.  Eight sectoral regulators have competition law powers in the UK, in addition to the CMA as the primary competition authority.[1] 

On June 1, 2023, the Commission published revised Research & Development and Specialization Block Exemption Regulations (“R&D BER” and “Specialization BER”, together the “HBERs”)[1] , as well as revised Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation (“Horizontal Guidelines”).[2]  The new HBERs exempt certain agreements from the prohibition of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”), subject to specific conditions, and accordingly create a so-called “safe harbor” for certain forms of horizontal cooperation.  Relatedly, the Horizontal Guidelines aim to guide undertakings in the interpretation and application of the revised HBERs, and thereby in their assessment of “various common types of horizontal cooperation agreements.”[3]