Huanbing Xu

On January 9, 2025, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (“MOFCOM”) released its decision in a trade and investment barrier investigation into the European Union’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”).

On September 24, 2024, the European Commission (EC) conditionally approved, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), the acquisition of PPF Telecom Group (PPF) by Emirates Telecommunications Group Company PJSC (e&).[1]  The EC’s clearance is subject to commitments valid for 10 years, which may be extended by another 5 years.  This is the EC’s first Phase II conditional clearance decision under the FSR, which started to apply on July 12, 2023.[2].

On September 14, 2024, China’s SAMR published streamlined notification and publicity forms for cases reviewed under its simplified merger review procedure (“Simple Cases”).  The revised forms will take effect as of October 12, 2024.

More than one and half year after the amendments to China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (the “AML”) came into effect, the State Council of China approved on December 29, 2023 and published on January 26, 2024 revisions[1] to China’s merger control notification thresholds (the “State Council Order”).[2]

Antitrust enforcement in labor markets has become a focus of the U.S. antitrust regulators in recent years, with particular scrutiny on agreements between employers not to recruit or solicit each other’s employees—so-called “no poach” agreements.  In a recent decision, a court in China held no‑poach and employee compensation-fixing agreements to be illegal, the first such court decision in the country.  The court’s decision, however, reveals the difficulties in analyzing no-poach agreements within China’s existing antitrust regime and analytical framework.  This article provides an overview of the Chinese court’s reasoning in its recent decision and a comparative assessment to the approach in the United States.