In a judgment issued on February 2, 2021,[1] the Council of State confirmed that Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A. (the Italian railway network manager, “RFI”) and Trenitalia S.p.A. (an Italian railway transport operator, “Trenitalia”) abused market dominance by engaging in dilatory tactics in the context of proceedings with the competent authorities, thus hindering access of a new entrant, Arenaways S.p.A. (“Arenaways”), to the railway passenger transport sector.

On 2 February 2021, the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal by several mobile network operators (MNOs) to overturn disclosure orders that the MNOs’ executives’ personal devices and communications be examined by independent IT experts. Phones4U entered administration in 2014, following the termination of its contracts with several important commercial partners, including the defendant MNOs, from January 2013 onwards.

On January 29, 2021, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) unconditionally cleared Engie’s acquisition, through its subsidiary Storengy, of a controlling stake in Dijon Métropole Smart EnergHy (“DMSE”), a joint venture between Dijon Métropole and the Rougeot group specialized in the production and distribution of hydrogen.[1] The FCA cleared the concentration even though the combined entity will become the first and sole operator producing and distributing hydrogen in the Dijon area.

On January 28, 2021, the Court of Justice upheld the General Court’s ruling that the Commission’s request for information (“RFI”) issued during its predatory pricing investigation of Qualcomm was necessary and proportionate.[1] The judgment further strengthens antitrust authorities’ broad discretion in deciding on the scope of RFIs.

On January 27, 2021, the Commission published its decision to conditionally approve Novelis’ acquisition of Aleris, two suppliers of flat-rolled aluminum sheets.[1]

The Commission pushed the boundaries of its own powers in merger control proceedings, both in terms of substance and procedure. With respect to substance, the Commission introduced in its decision a new theory of harm for the competitive analysis of transactions, particularly with respect to markets affected by significant capacity constraints. From a procedural standpoint, the Commission adopted far-reaching measures to enforce the commitments that had been offered– and eventually infringed–by the parties to the transaction.

In connection with the forthcoming transposition of Directive No. 2019/1 (the “ECN+ Directive”), which exposes professional associations to higher fines for anti-competitive practices, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) has published a study on how competition law applies to professional associations and made a number of practical recommendations.[1]

On January 27, 2021,[1] the Court of Justice confirmed a 2018 General Court judgment,[2] upholding a 2014 Commission decision which found Goldman Sachs jointly and severally liable, together with its former subsidiary Prysmian, for Prysmian’s participation in a cartel. The judgment strengthens the parental liability doctrine with potential implications for financial investors.

On 27 January, the CMA published guidance for businesses on the application of UK competition law to co-operative agreements aimed at achieving environmental or sustainability objectives (the Guidance). The role of competition law in supporting environmental initiatives has seen greater focus as the UK government pursues its 2050 net zero target and the European Union seeks to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 (discussed here). The Guidance explains the application of existing block exemptions and guidance for firms assessing whether agreements with sustainability objectives risk infringing competition law, and is part of a wider programme of activities that the CMA is carrying out to support sustainability objectives.