Policy & Procedure

On December 23, 2020, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) presented a summary report of its 2020 activity and set out its priorities for 2021.[1]

On December 15, 2020, the Commission published its proposal for the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”),[1] which would impose a list of  ex  ante  obligations on designated large online platforms that meet certain thresholds. The proposed DMA aims at preventing practices by large online platforms that, according to the Commission, either fall outside or cannot be effectively addressed by the existing EU competition rules. The DMA would represent a far-reaching expansion of the Commission’s regulatory powers in digital markets, and would significantly increase the regulatory burden on the designated companies.

On December 9, 2020, the Court of Justice annulled the Commission’s decision that accepted Paramount’s commitments to remove from its licensing agreements with broadcasters any obligation that prevents broadcasters from responding to cross-border requests for pay-TV subscriptions (the “Commitments Decision”).[1] The Court of Justice concluded that the Commitments Decision breached the principle of proportionality because it negated contractual rights of Canal+ and other counterparties to Paramount’s licensing agreements who were not involved in the Commission’s proceedings.

On 15 October 2020, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) revoked a £300,000 penalty it had imposed on JD Sports Fashion plc for breach of an interim enforcement order (IEO) issued in connection with JD Sports’ completed acquisition of Footasylum plc. The penalty was withdrawn “[i]n light of issues raised on appeal.” This is the first time that a CMA procedural fine has been revoked or overturned on appeal. On 19 and 20 October 2020, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) heard Facebook’s appeal against the CMA’s refusal to grant a derogation from an IEO issued in connection with Facebook’s completed acquisition of GIPHY, Inc. This article considers potential implications of these cases for future UK mergers.

Over the past several months, there have been a number of statements by politicians and Member State governments regarding the reform of EU competition law. Much of this debate is fundamentally linked to how authorities should define the relevant product and geographic markets that guide their antitrust and merger investigations.

Decree n°2019-1247 of November 28, 2019, published in the Official Journal of the French Republic on November 29, 2019 (the “Decree”), provides the procedural framework for the FCA’s new power to access telephone communications data for the purpose of antitrust investigations under Article L. 450-3-3 of the French Commercial Code. This framework was introduced by the Pacte Law [1] and allows the FCA to request access to technical information regarding the identity of a caller, the telecommunication terminals used, the data, time, and duration of each call, and the phone numbers called. It will be operational as soon as the Data Request Supervisor (“contrôleur des demandes de données de connexion”) is appointed (the Supervisor will be appointed among the judges of the French Administrative or Civil Supreme Court).[2]

On November 25, 2020, the FCA chose to depart from its long-standing decisional practice on intra- group bidding.[1] Following the European Court of Justice’s ruling in Ecoservice projektai,[2] the FCA concluded that intra-group bids to tenders no longer fall within the ambit of competition law.

On 6 November, the CMA published new draft guidance on jurisdiction and procedure in UK merger cases (Draft J&P Guidance) and on the CMA’s mergers intelligence function. On 17 November, it published new draft guidance on the substantive assessment of mergers in the UK (Draft Substantive Guidance). The draft sets of Guidance incorporate developments in the case law, reflect the evolution of the CMA’s policies and procedures, and take account of changes in the legal framework concerning public interest mergers. Together, they confirm the CMA’s expansive approach to asserting jurisdiction and reinforce a more interventionist and less formalistic approach to assessing mergers, especially in digital markets, that has been evident in the run-up to Brexit.