Cartels

On February 5, 2020, the FCO announced that it has no competitive concerns regarding the launch of the agricultural online trading platform operated by unamera GmbH (“Unamera”).[1] The FCO pointed out that while digital platforms can make trading much more efficient, it must be ensured that they must not restrict competition: Digital platforms must not be subject to price-fixing agreements, they must be non-discriminatory and there must not be excessive transparency.

On January 29, 2020, the Cour de Cassation annulled the judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal in the interbank fees case for interpreting the concept of restriction by object too broadly. The Cour de Cassation noted that only coordination practices that harm competition to a sufficient degree may be qualified as restrictions by object. Absent a clearly established anticompetitive object, likely anticompetitive effects must be proven to establish an infringement of Articles 101(1) TFEU and L. 420-1 of the French Commercial Code.

On January 28, 2020, the Italian Competition Authority (the “ICA”) issued a decision finding that four telecom operators, namely Fastweb S.p.A. (“Fastweb”), Telecom Italia S.p.A. (“TIM” or “Telecom”), Vodafone Italia S.p.A. (“Vodafone”) and Wind Tre S.p.A. (“Wind Tre”) (together, the “Operators”), participated in a cartel aimed at coordinating their commercial strategies, with a view to keeping prices high during the transition from four-week (28 days) billing to monthly billing (so-called repricing), thus impeding competition and limiting the risk of customers migrating to other competitors.[1]

On January 21, 2020, the Council of State confirmed the annulment of a 2017 ICA decision sanctioning a cartel between manufacturers of reinforcing steel bars (rebars) and welded wire mesh.[1] In particular, the ICA fined eight companies (namely, Feralpi Siderurgica S.p.A., Ori Martin Acciaieria e Ferriera di Brescia S.p.A., Industrie Riunite Odolesi I.R.O. S.p.A., Riva Acciaio S.p.A., Ferriere Nord S.p.A. and Fin. Fer S.p.A., Stefana S.p.A., Ferriera Valsabbia S.p.A. and Alfa Acciai S.p.A., together the “Manufacturers”) in an amount in excess of €140 million for allegedly coordinating their commercial strategies between 2010 and 2016, by fixing prices and exchanging sensitive information (among other things through the trade association Nuovo Campsider, “NC”).[2] The Council of State, fully upholding the TAR Lazio’s reasoning at first instance,[3] held that the appeal lodged by the ICA was unfounded on two fronts.

On January 10, 2020, the Council of State rejected the appeals brought against two judgments issued by the TAR Lazio in 2016, which upheld an ICA decision finding an anticompetitive bid rigging agreement in the railway transportation sector.[1] In particular, in 2015 the ICA found that 12 companies active in the railway industry had secretly colluded with a view systematically to allocating public procurement contracts covering the whole national territory, as well as by agreeing on their respective bids.[2]

Background

The decision of the ICA

On December 21, 2016, the ICA concluded its investigation into certain anticompetitive practices allegedly implemented by major firms active in the provision of home oxygen therapy (“HO”) and home mechanical ventilation (“HMV”) services. According to the ICA, Linde Medicale S.r.l. (“Linde”), Medicair Italia S.r.l. (“Medicair”), Medigas Italia S.r.l. (“Medigas”), Sapio Life S.r.l. (“Sapio”), Vitalaire Italia S.p.A. (“Vitalaire”), Vivisol S.r.l. (“Vivisol”), Eubios S.r.l. (“Eubios”), Oxy Live S.r.l. (“Oxy”), Ossigas S.r.l. (“Ossigas”), Magaldi Life S.r.l. (“Magaldi”) and Ter.gas. S.r.l. (“Ter.gas.”) participated in three separate agreements affecting the outcome of open tender procedures for the provision of HMV in part of the Milan province, HMV and HO in the Marche region and HO in the Campania region, launched by ASL Milano 1, ASUR Marche and SORESA between 2012 and 2014.[1]

On December 23, 2019, the Council of State upheld the appeals brought by TIM and a number of firms active in the provision of corrective maintenance services for its electronic communications networks (the “Maintenance Firms”)against the judgments of the TAR Lazio that had confirmed the ICA’s decision finding an anticompetitive agreement in the market for the above-mentioned services.[1]