European Union

On October 5, 2020, the General Court partially annulled three European Commission decisions ordering French supermarket groups Casino and Intermarché to submit to unannounced inspections.1[1]The General Court found that the Commission did not have sufficiently strong evidence to suspect one of the alleged infringements and had therefore breached the dawn raided companies’ right to the inviolability of the home.

On October 5, 2020, the General Court dismissed an action for annulment by HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement (the “parent companies”) against the Commission’s April 2017 decision,[1] which prohibited their acquisition of Cemex’s Croatian and Hungarian subsidiaries through Duna-Dráva Cement (“DDC”), a full-function JV (“JV”) equally owned and controlled by the parent companies. [2]

October 2020 saw important developments with respect to the procedural framework surrounding the Commission’s evidence-gathering powers. A General Court judgment on the appropriateness of dawn raids at three French supermarket chains and the Court’s interim order regarding the Commission’s ongoing probe into Facebook’s data practices both have practical implications for companies under investigation.

On September 16, 2020, the Court of Justice ruled on the interpretation of the concept of “court or tribunal” within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.[1] The Court of Justice held the reference for a preliminary ruling inadmissible, for lack of the referring Spanish competition authority (“CNMC”) constituting a “court or tribunal” for the purpose of Article 267 TFEU.

On September 11, 2020, Commissioner Vestager during a speech at a conference[1] for the 30th anniversary of the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”),[2] outlined her vision on merger control policy for the upcoming years.[3] In anticipation of the Commission’s long awaited report on its 2016 consultation on the evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control, Commissioner Vestager shed some light on the Commission’s position on (i) notification thresholds; (ii) the simplification of merger filing and review processes; and (iii) its reflections on the substance of merger review in certain sectors.

For more than a decade, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (“VBER”)[1] and the accompanying Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (“Guidelines”)[2] have been the essential point of reference for the assessment of resale and distribution arrangements[3] under EU antitrust rules. With the VBER set to expire in 2022, the Commission in 2018 launched a review process to determine whether it should let the regulation lapse, prolong, or revise it.[4] After almost two years of evaluation, stakeholder feedback, public consultations and dialogues with national authorities, on September 9, 2020, the Commission published its report summarizing the outcomes of the evaluation.[5] The report provides a detailed overview of the VBER’s shortcomings and points of strength, and paves the way for the possible introduction of a revised regulation within the next two years.

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic disruption, as a consequence of the prolonged and re-occurring shutdowns and the ongoing political and economic uncertainties.

On August 17, 2020, the Commission conditionally approved Mastercard’s acquisition of Nets’ payment application division, following a Phase I review (“the Transaction”).[1] The Commission reviewed the Transaction following a referral by the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, and ultimately identified competitive concerns in an EEA-wide market for account-to-account core infrastructure services (“A2A CIS”) in relation to managed solutions that required the transfer of the overlapping business to secure Phase I approval.