On December 23, 2020, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) presented a summary report of its 2020 activity and set out its priorities for 2021.[1]
Proposals for Reform of Competition Law Policy: Proposed Revision of the Commission’s Market Definition Guidance
Over the past several months, there have been a number of statements by politicians and Member State governments regarding the reform of EU competition law. Much of this debate is fundamentally linked to how authorities should define the relevant product and geographic markets that guide their antitrust and merger investigations.
New Investigative Power for the French Competition Authority to Access Telephone Communications Data
Decree n°2019-1247 of November 28, 2019, published in the Official Journal of the French Republic on November 29, 2019 (the “Decree”), provides the procedural framework for the FCA’s new power to access telephone communications data for the purpose of antitrust investigations under Article L. 450-3-3 of the French Commercial Code. This framework was introduced by the Pacte Law [1] and allows the FCA to request access to technical information regarding the identity of a caller, the telecommunication terminals used, the data, time, and duration of each call, and the phone numbers called. It will be operational as soon as the Data Request Supervisor (“contrôleur des demandes de données de connexion”) is appointed (the Supervisor will be appointed among the judges of the French Administrative or Civil Supreme Court).[2]
CMA Proposes New Procedural and Substantive Merger Guidance
On 6 November, the CMA published new draft guidance on jurisdiction and procedure in UK merger cases (Draft J&P Guidance) and on the CMA’s mergers intelligence function. On 17 November, it published new draft guidance on the substantive assessment of mergers in the UK (Draft Substantive Guidance). The draft sets of Guidance incorporate developments in the case law, reflect the evolution of the CMA’s policies and procedures, and take account of changes in the legal framework concerning public interest mergers. Together, they confirm the CMA’s expansive approach to asserting jurisdiction and reinforce a more interventionist and less formalistic approach to assessing mergers, especially in digital markets, that has been evident in the run-up to Brexit.
Court Denies Spanish NCA Status as “Court or Tribunal” for Making Preliminary References (Anesco)
On September 16, 2020, the Court of Justice ruled on the interpretation of the concept of “court or tribunal” within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.[1] The Court of Justice held the reference for a preliminary ruling inadmissible, for lack of the referring Spanish competition authority (“CNMC”) constituting a “court or tribunal” for the purpose of Article 267 TFEU.
The French Competition Authority Reserves the Right To Refer to the European Commission Transactions That Do Not Reach the National Notification Threshold
On September 15, 2020, Margaret Vestager announced that the European Commission would, as of mid-2021, accept referrals from national competition authorities for transactions that do not reach any national notification thresholds under Article 22 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (“Article 22”).[1] This provision enables a national competition authority to request that the European Commission examine a transaction that does not meet the European Union notification thresholds, but would affect trade between Member States and threaten to significantly affect competition.
A Step Forward in the Journey ‘Towards More Effective EU Merger Control’?
On September 11, 2020, Commissioner Vestager during a speech at a conference[1] for the 30th anniversary of the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”),[2] outlined her vision on merger control policy for the upcoming years.[3] In anticipation of the Commission’s long awaited report on its 2016 consultation on the evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control, Commissioner Vestager shed some light on the Commission’s position on (i) notification thresholds; (ii) the simplification of merger filing and review processes; and (iii) its reflections on the substance of merger review in certain sectors.
Block Exemption Troubleshooting: How E-commerce Is Reshaping EU Antitrust Policy on Distribution Agreements
For more than a decade, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (“VBER”)[1] and the accompanying Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (“Guidelines”)[2] have been the essential point of reference for the assessment of resale and distribution arrangements[3] under EU antitrust rules. With the VBER set to expire in 2022, the Commission in 2018 launched a review process to determine whether it should let the regulation lapse, prolong, or revise it.[4] After almost two years of evaluation, stakeholder feedback, public consultations and dialogues with national authorities, on September 9, 2020, the Commission published its report summarizing the outcomes of the evaluation.[5] The report provides a detailed overview of the VBER’s shortcomings and points of strength, and paves the way for the possible introduction of a revised regulation within the next two years.
The FCO’s Acitivites in the First Half of 2020
On September 2, 2020, the German Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) published its Annual Report 2019/2020 (“Annual Report”) which includes an update on the FCO’s activities in the first half of 2020.[1]